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Abstract 
Kai-Uwe Werbeck 
The Interface as Door:  
On the Problem of Access to the Image in Kafka’s Das Schloß and Interactive Media 
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard Langston) 
 
Is the interface a door into the image? In order to enter an image, the image must offer space. 
By juxtaposing two very different texts, Franz Kafka’s Das Schloß and the video game 
Wonderboy in Monsterworld, this thesis asks what kind of space we access through the 
interface. A reading of doors in Das Schloß as a metaphor of the interface shows that Kafka 
considers the image uncontrollable, creating the illusion of depth when, in fact, there is none. 
In comparison, video games allow control over and access to a Bildraum. The video game 
player accepts the depth of the virtual landscape and enters the image via virtual doors. Has 
Kafka’s concept of the image become obsolete or does a reading of video games through the 
lens of his critique reveal that the video game image is even more deceptive than its non-
digital predecessor? 
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Chapter 1: 
The Image in Franz Kafka’s Das Schloß 
 
Introduction: 
 
Can we enter a Bildraum? In order to enter an image we have to access it via an 
appropriate door. The interface is such a door into the space of an image. Susan Sontag 
argues that photographs are “attempts to contact or lay claim to another reality” (16). What 
kind of space awaits us when we enter such a new reality and why do we want to enter it at 
all? Sontag argues that a photograph helps “people to take possession of space in which they 
are insecure” (9). The reason for the exploration of an image is the urge to gain control over a 
space. This implies that the spaces outside the image have become increasingly difficult to 
control and that the access to images helps us to reconfigure our bodily experience of space 
through the image. Access to a Bildraum is a means of control of this space. 
In order to access an image, it must offer depth. Roland Barthes states that the 
“photograph belongs to that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated 
without destroying them both [like] the windowpane and the landscape […]” (6). Barthes 
never contests that photographs show a flat image, similar to the landscape framed within a 
windowpane (106). Barthes calls this the spectrum and the spectator “can either desire the 
object, the landscape, [or] the body it represents” (19). This is the look out of the window and 
 2 
what Barthes calls studium, which, for him, is an “order of liking, not of loving” (27). 
However, the studium never reveals the photograph itself, which “is always invisible: it is not 
it that we see” (Barthes 6). What constitutes the essence of the photograph cannot be 
accessed via the studium. Barthes points out that this essence is accessible only through the 
“extension of a field,” which expands the photograph beyond the two-dimensions of its 
spectrum. Now the window opens and the viewer connects to the Bildraum and its extended 
field. This extended field is linked to what Barthes terms the punctum, the element in the 
field that “rises from the scene” and pierces the viewer’s body (26). This piercing element 
exceeds the two-dimensions of the image, the spectrum, and is able to affect the body. 
Through this extension, body and image are linked via an umbilical cord. Still the Bildraum 
offers the punctum to the viewer, which means that although body and image are connected it 
is not the viewer who actively controls the image. Rather, the image offers a possibility to 
extend the field of the image into meaning. 
This extension is not identical with the image, but a supplement of the image that 
opens the “depth of any possible meaning” (106). The punctum is freed from any cultural 
context. The point of departure into the essence of the photograph is located in the tension 
between the spectrum and the autonomy of the punctum.1 The punctum for Barthes is a 
detail, both spatial and temporal, within the spectrum that does not stand in direct relation to 
the studium of the image. It allows the viewer to experience an extension of the Bildraum. 
Barthes’ concept of the photograph, as the first new media image and the basis for the 
moving-image in film, advocates an understanding of the image that exceeds its fixed 
                                                 
1
 As Barthes remarks, “the studium is ultimately always coded, the punctum is not” (51). This observation 
demarcates the content of the image from the extended field which the punctum opens up. 
 
 3 
flatness.2 The extension of the photographic image is located outside of the flat 
representation of the picture or the screen. Does this extension open up a Bildraum? If so, it 
is clearly not a Euclidean space.3 An image can open up in order to extend itself so that the 
viewer can attach new meaning to the photograph. This process is reciprocal, meaning that 
the punctum pierces the body in the same way the body reaches out into the Bildraum. This 
creates a direct connection between image and body.4 Barthes’ punctum is a connection to an 
image, although he does not tell us whether we can enter the image through this connection. 
To be able to do so, the image needs to have space. In order to control this space, i.e. to 
navigate it, we must enter it and know what its qualities are. 
If an image has space, we can think of the interface as a door into this space. The 
image already is a space in so far as the viewer immerses himself in the image and belongs to 
its space. Following Barthes, it is far from being a Euclidean space, but nevertheless exceeds 
the two dimensions of the spectrum in which the only depth is depth of field.5 It is a 
Bildraum that functions differently from the three-dimensional space we are used to 
navigating. If navigational patterns of Euclidean space are mistakenly applied to the space of 
an image, navigation in the image-space cannot be controlled. In order to adapt our system of 
navigation to the space of an image, we need the mediating element of the interface - the 
door into the image. The interface is a door through which we enter into what Susan Sontag 
                                                 
2
 Barthes distinguishes between cinema and photography in that the latter captures something that has been, 
whereas the former reenacts fiction that was (79). Nevertheless, Barthes considers photography the “raw 
material” of cinema (89). 
 
3
 Euclidean space is defined as a set of points in a three-dimensional environment which can be expressed in 
terms of distance and angles. Euclidean space presents object after object after object. To qualify as Euclidean 
space, this alignment of objects has to have the faculty of translatability onto an idealized flat surface without 
any breaks. This thesis sets Euclidean space in contrast to the space of the image. 
 
4
 Barthes finally concludes that he “passed beyond the unreality of the thing represented [and…] entered crazily 
into the spectacle, into the image” (117). 
 
5
 This is a purely visual concept of depth, in contrast to one which can be explored physically. 
 4 
calls the composite units of the “image-world that bids to outlast us all” (11). I will argue that 
the image has depth and can be accessed as a space, although the latter poses difficulties and 
can lead us astray. Since doors are intended to penetrate an otherwise impenetrable structure, 
it is only through sensory-motor interaction with the door that the image can be accessed as 
space. The difficulty of the accessed space we encounter lies in its properties, which differ 
from those of Euclidean space. Once we stepped through the door, the question is if it is 
possible to navigate securely within the space of an image and thereby control it.  
To answer this question we must understand the “doorness” of the interface and the 
properties of the space to which it grants access. Therefore, this thesis juxtaposes two texts 
that deal with the question of doors as markers of access, depth, and control. A close reading 
of these texts helps us to understand whether the image can be controlled. Both texts present 
non-Euclidean spaces and tell us something about our relation to these spaces. Kafka’s Das 
Schloß and Sega’s Wonderboy in Monsterworld both focus on doors and their function as 
markers of access to depth in relation to control. Walter Benjamin famously remarked that 
there “are two ways to miss the point in Kafka’s works. One is to interpret them naturally; 
the other is the supernatural interpretation” (1969 127). Following Benjamin’s claim then, 
this thesis is neither a theological nor a psycho-analytical reading of Kafka – it is a video 
game reading of Das Schloß and vice versa. These readings allow us to answer the question 
how the image is a space and if it is possible to navigate within these image-spaces. The 
point of departure is a place in front of the door and the first step is to cross the threshold of 
the image. The journey starts with the interface. 
 
 
 5 
Kafka and Cinema: From Movie Screen to Interface 
 
 Kafka’s life was shaped by the advent of cinema as part of the modern experience. He 
was highly interested in cinema and the reactions of audiences in movie theatres. These 
reactions were shock-like, because the audience had difficulties in dealing with the new 
relationship between subject and object. Hanns Zischler informs us that audiences during 
Kafka’s lifetime fell into stupor when a train passed on the screen (15). Bianca Theisen 
writes that people in Kafka’s time tried to run away from the screen when a train seemed to 
move at them (543). Parts of the audience could not comprehend that the close-up of a hand 
did not mean that it was severed from the body. This shock results from the viewer’s 
interaction with the movie screen, or more precisely a non-interaction, triggered through a 
loss of control. The processes which take place within the moment of mediation between a 
single viewer and the interface influence our understanding of the world. The interface 
carries the potential to reconfigure our understanding of space. This reconfiguration can lead 
to an unsteady relation between the body and the space it occupies. 
Lutz Koepnick defines the interface as “a device not merely framing and ordering our 
view of the world but also allowing for reciprocal sensory contact between the human body 
and a world of unsteady representations” (17). This is the interface Kafka would have 
experienced, because the term itself only gained its importance in relation to the rise of 
digital media. Koepnick's definition helps us to understand that the interface works well 
outside of its usual digital connotation.6 Norie Neumark interviewed cultural theorists 
                                                 
6
 Christina Zimmer argues that cinema changed the relation between human beings and their environment. 
“Insbesondere die Entwicklung neuer Medien wie Telegraf, Telefon, […] und die Entdeckung des 
stroboskopischen Effekts, der für die Entwicklung von Kino entscheidend war, führten zu einer tiefgreifenden 
Veränderung des Welterlebens und des menschlichen Zusammenlebens, die Kafka hautnah miterlebte“ (13).  
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regarding how they imagine an interface outside of the digital domain.7 During these 
interviews, cultural archeologist Albert Liu named scuba-gear as a non-digital interface since 
it allows access to an “unnatural, inhuman experience” (Neumark 303). Wardrobe consultant 
and cultural critic Celeste Olalquiaga envisioned gliding on rollerblades as a “protective, 
fluid and robotic […] moment of the interface between the city and the machine” (Neumark 
303). Finally, cultural historian Klaus Theweleit named nakedness as a non-digital interface 
(Neumark 304). These associations make clear that the interface is deeply linked to ideas of 
immersion and the exploration of “foreign” spaces, movement and the physical experience of 
a given topography. Skin is defined as the closest possible distance to the outer world. All of 
the aforementioned associations are in more or less abstract terms related to the idea of lines 
of demarcation. In other words, they are all versions of the threshold.8 These thresholds are 
links to the outside world and set in reciprocal relationship to the body and the movie screen 
is such a threshold. To cross such a threshold is an act of control. 
The interface of the movie screen can produce effects of spatial destabilization during 
moments of immersion. Parts of the audience experienced space as unstable because the lines 
of demarcation were blurred and the foreign places and their topography were not clearly 
defined in relation to the space the single viewer physically occupied. As a result, people 
assumed that the aforementioned train might hit them.9 Kafka as a second-order observer was 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
7
 These interviews were done during a radio show hosted by Neumark. Three examples, by Liu, Olalquiaga, and 
Theweleit, are given here. The pages refer to the article in which these interviews were transcribed and 
published (Neumark 303-304). 
 
8
 Chapter Two defines the interface within its “natural” environment, namely digital media. 
 
 
9
 In addition, space is destablelized even further. As Merleau-Ponty points out, “the train coming towards us, at 
the cinema, increases in size much more than it would in reality” (303). Control over the act of perception is 
rendered difficult through this recalibration of visual relations. 
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well aware of these effects. Although he was an avid movie-goer, Kafka understood cinema, 
to quote Hanns Zischler, as a “fast dämonische Technik, die an das erworbene Sehen, die 
Seh- und sie Schreibkraft des Autors sehr hohe, qualvolle Anforderungen stellt” (22). The 
reaction of the audience is caused by a break with quotidian patterns of perception. This 
effect imprinted itself on other forms of media. In relation to Kafka, it is Adorno who links 
this reaction and its effects to literature.10  
[Kafka’s] texts are designed not to sustain a constant distance between 
themselves and their victim but rather to agitate to agitate his feelings to a point 
where he fears that the narrative will shot towards him like a locomotive in a three 
dimensional film. Such aggressive physical proximity undermines the reader’s habit 
of identifying himself with the figures in the novel. (246)  
 
What the “victim,” according to Adorno’s understanding, experiences both in film and 
literature is a phenomenological crisis that spatially cuts off the individual from its surrogates 
on the screen and in the text, abolishing any form of control. The individual has to leave 
normative patterns of perception behind, in which the space occupied by the subject stands in 
stable relation to the perceived object. Instead, the subject has to deal with a disconnection 
that creates shock-like experiences, such as the “three-dimensional” train that moves towards 
the subject although he never placed himself in its way.11  
Christina Zimmer argues that Kafka dealt with this experience by creating a “mediale 
Lebensform” whereby literature acquires the status of reality (12).12 The resulting text does 
                                                 
10
 This argument found its way into media theory. Lev Manovich states that “the printed word and cinema have 
indeed become interfaces – rich sets of metaphors, ways of navigating through content, ways of accessing and 
storing data” (73). 
 
11
 Of course, any movie-goer places himself in front of the screen, but the image on screen can move from a 
perspective in which the train does not move towards the viewer to a perspective in which this is the case, 
without the viewer himself significantly changing his position. 
 
12
 This life-form is meant as a proxy, a “medialer Stellvertreter” (Zimmer 137). Once created, it utilizes its 
respective medium as a “Schutzraum,” in which interaction can take place without face to face communication 
(Zimmer 141). Zimmer argues that Kafka hoped to hide behind the proxy in order to avoid any traumatic 
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not allow the reader to identify himself with the protagonist, because it simulates the 
disconnect.13 However, Kafka’s literature does grant access to the phenomenological 
experience of the protagonist, even without offering direct identification or control. Kafka 
tried to overcome the crisis of the subject-object relationship by attempting a direct literal 
translation of his cinematic experiences into literature. In conclusion, it must be possible to 
salvage these experiences from his writings. Following Adorno, we can argue that Kafka’s 
works have a similar impact as moving images on screen; they convey feelings of dislocation 
and instability. Literary construction in Kafka’s work then is not a purely literary process, but 
rather includes modes of perception that go beyond the medium of literature. Literary 
construction is dialogically influenced by cinema, and thereby incorporates the interface and 
the image-spaces that accompany it. A close reading of Kafka and his, what William J. Dodd 
terms, “word-images” reveals Kafka’s understanding of a Bildraum (7). 
 
Space in Kafka: Instable Representations and Restricted Spaces 
 
 Space or, more precisely, movement through space plays a vital role in Kafka’s work. 
The relation of the subject to a given space is a crucial factor of space in Kafka. However, 
referential self-localization becomes problematic as soon as spaces are not stable in their 
relation to the body. An analysis of spatial structures in Kafka’s works reveals that space is 
utterly unstable in this respect.  
                                                                                                                                                       
impacts on the body (143). A photograph, following Zimmer, erases the threatening quality of a real body and is 
simultaneously banned from a temporal progression and stored “im Augenblick” (144). 
 
13
 Clayton Koelb explains both the crisis of disconnection and the resulting “mediale Lebensform” as follows: 
“The ‘real’ Franz Kafka remains at home […] snug as a bug. Meanwhile creatures named Raban or Gracchus or 
Samsa pace out their moments of pain in some distant literary space” (30). 
 
 9 
The messenger in “Eine kaiserliche Botschaft” moves from one spatial structure to 
another in order to deliver the late Emperor’s messages.14 The narrator concludes that even if 
the messenger made it through the first chamber, he would never be able to reach his goal.15 
Space for Kafka then is a paradox phenomenon. It is a barrier, while at the same time, it is 
impossible to arrive at the limits of this barrier.16 If the messenger arrives at such a barrier 
against all odds, another space opens up, until the spatial dimensions surpass the temporal 
boundaries of human life.17 Kafka writes that 
wenn der Weise sagt: ‘Gehe hinüber’, so meint er nicht, daß man auf die 
andere Seite hinüber gehen solle, was man immerhin noch leisten könnte, wenn das 
Ergebnis des Weges wert wäre, sondern er meint irgendein sagenhaftes Drüben, 
etwas, das wir nicht kennen, das auch von ihm nicht näher zu bezeichnen ist und das 
uns also hier gar nichts helfen kann. (Erzählungen 252) 
 
Kafka generates a space that is not located on this plane of existence. Traversal through space 
does not lead us onto this plane. Instead, the space the sage talks about is located beyond 
Euclidean space and is ultimately alien, unknown, and difficult to comprehend. Kafka’s 
                                                 
14
 Ritchie Robertson sums up how the messenger traverses “through the royal palace, and the inner chambers, 
the stairs, the courtyards, the outer palace […] (105). 
 
15
 The paradoxical nature of space in Kafka is exemplified in the following quote. „Aber statt dessen, wie 
nutzlos müht er sich ab, immer noch zwängt er sich durch die Gemächer des innersten Palastes; niemals wird er 
sie überwinden; und gelänge ihm dies, nichts wäre gewonnen; die Höfe wären zu durchmessen; und nach den 
Höfen der zweite umschließende Palast“ (Erzählungen 188). The subjunctive in the second part of the quote 
takes into account a phenomenon that, according to the first part of the quote, is not possible in the first place. 
 
16
 The concept of the barrier is explicitly mentioned in Das Schloß. Olga explains to K. that her brother, the 
messenger Barnabas, has access to the chambers, “aber es ist doch nur ein Teil aller, dann sind Barrieren, und 
hinter ihnen noch andere Kanzleien” (Schloß 198). These barriers are unstable demarcations. Olga tells K. not 
to believe that these barriers signify a clear border. “Diese Barrieren darfst du dir auch nicht als eine bestimmte 
Grenze vorstellen […]. Barrieren sind auch in den Kanzleien, in die [Barnabas] geht; es gibt also auch 
Barrieren, die er passiert, und sie sehen nicht anders aus als die, über die er noch nicht hinweggekommen ist, 
und es ist auch deshalb nicht von vornherein anzunehmen, daß sich hinter diesen letzteren Barrieren wesentlich 
andere Kanzleien befinden als jene, in denen Barnabas schon war“ (Schloß 198). These barriers are not clearly 
defined but they can still fulfill their function of denying access. 
 
17
 Kafka makes this biological limitation very clear in “Das nächste Dorf”, saying that “schon die Zeit des 
gewöhnlichen, glücklich ablaufenden Lebens für einen solchen Ritt bei weitem nicht hinreicht“ (Erzählungen 
187). 
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aphorism resembles Ernst Bloch’s concept of the gate. Bloch argues that some gates lead to 
more than just another earthly space, from one plane of existence to another.18 Space in 
Kafka is constructed of planes which are not necessarily connected as purely Euclidean 
spaces. For example, the biologically determined life-span of a human being stands in 
relation to spatial limits. This becomes clear in Der Proceß. The topography created in the 
novel leads Josef K. from one space to another, but in the end leads to death. Death is a non-
Euclidean dimension, which shows that space for Kafka exceeds the three geometrical 
dimensions that are usually related with our understanding of space. Death, in Kafka, means 
progress. 
Even three-dimensional space is in itself unstable. The architectural space in Der 
Proceß is a presentation of multiple connected buildings and floors leading from one level to 
another through doors. This architecture creates spaces through which the reader 
accompanies Josef K. Der Proceß consists of episodes set in distinct surroundings, such as 
the bank, the court, and Josef K.’s home, spaces that, as Martin Walser argues, grant “no 
pauses, no digressions and no possibilities of escape” (126). If one, for whatever reason, 
wants to traverse but cannot leave the space he occupies, then by definition a barrier of some 
kind stands in the way. This barrier can be a physical boundary, a barrier within a subject, or 
something in between. We must say then that traversal through space in Kafka is often 
restricted through barriers.  
                                                 
18
 Bloch describes his motif of the gate as follows: “Geht einer aus der Türe, so kann man ihn zwar gleichfalls 
nicht mehr sehen. Auch er verschwindet, als ob er stürbe, mit einem Male, der Zug biegt um die Ecke. Dennoch 
besteht, selbst bei weiten und gefährlichen Fahrten, der einleuchtende Unterschied, daß der lebend abreisende 
auf unserer Ebene bleibt, und zwar buchstäblich: man kann ihn auf unserm Plan ohne Auf oder Ab der 
Bewegung wieder erreichen. Jedoch der Sterbende wechselt die Ebene“ (44). 
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For Kafka’s narratives, barriers create outsides and insides. This distinction impacts 
the way in which space presents itself. Kimberley Sparks points out that the outside 
“landscape is clearly a dead abstraction” in stories such as Das Urteil (123). She explains that 
when Georg Bendemann accesses the outside world after being sentenced to death by his 
father, “the houses constitute a long, segmented, repetitive image, physically parallel and 
visually analogous to the river” (122). The houses are either flat images like a stage set or 
stretch infinitely into the open, never meant to be fully explored. The exploded outside world 
is, although seemingly larger, of lesser importance than the confined inside spaces. The 
crucial encounters of Kafka’s protagonists take place in the restricted rooms behind the 
doors. Space in Kafka, then, is divided into infinite open exteriors and restricted interior 
spaces.19 This dichotomy plays into the question of control within a Bildraum. We can look 
at the exterior landscapes and toy with them, but the inside spaces of the image are restricted. 
In order to further explain what restricted spaces are for Kafka, it is helpful to look at 
philosophical influences. As Judith Ryan observes, Kafka was influenced by a mode of 
thought, “in which the external world is understood as a projection of the perceiver’s 
subjectivity” (68). Ryan makes a comparison between Kafka and Robert Walser. Ryan 
argues that Walser depicts a poet “who believes that his fantasy is more powerful than 
external reality” (69). Ryan then calls the fat man in “Beschreibung eines Kampfes” a parody 
of Walser’s poet, because the fat man actually reshapes the surrounding landscape, when he 
makes the path steeper. Ryan concludes that “while Walser’s poet is clearly trapped in his 
own narcissistic dream of creative potency, Kafka’s fat man actually does influence the 
                                                 
19
 Jeong-Suk Kim calls the restricted spaces “Enge” (106). She argues that the closer K. in Der Prozeß comes to 
the court, the stronger the “Enge” becomes (Kim 106). Kim interprets “Enge” as a symptom of 
“Schuldbewußtsein” (106). Space in Kafka, for her, is therefore an expression of the protagonist’s state of 
being. 
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landscape around him” (69). However, this only goes half the way. This control over space in 
Kafka’s story only functions in relation to open space, space that is not restricted through 
doors. Agency in Kafka is indeed immense in such open spaces, but as soon as a protagonist 
must enter a restricted space this agency is not only drastically limited but completely 
reversed. Restricted spaces, created by opposing forces, render agency futile.  
In order to utilize the more important restricted spaces, many of Kafka’s writings, like 
Der Prozeß and Das Schloß, focus on one main protagonist. Cyrena N. Pondrom argues that 
this technique creates a consciousness that is part of the world “by restricting the narrative to 
a single character” (74). This enables the reader to connect vision to a body traversing 
through space, a connection in which the reader is never separated from but at the same time 
never sutured to the protagonist. This style of narration, which Judith Ryan calls the “limited 
third person point of view,” is the only one suitable for the proper application of restricted 
spaces (66). Friedrich Beißner calls this perspective “uni-mental” which means “that the 
entire content of a narrative, all events, actions, characters, and scenes represented in it, are 
perceived by a single consciousness” (28). If the text allowed movement completely 
independent from the protagonist, to roam the attics and castles alongside multiple 
characters, the very idea of spaces demarcated from each other by barriers would collapse.  
The topographies through which Josef K., as such a uni-mental character, moves in 
Der Prozeß are examples of internal and restricted space in Kafka. The worlds in which 
Kafka places his protagonists in his fiction are networked structures in which, as Theodor W. 
Adorno observes, “the time-space continuum of ‘empirical realism’ is exploded” (261). 
Concepts of time and space overlap, their demarcations blur, thereby creating a space which 
is also measured in time or the lack thereof. The chambers in the attics are prime examples of 
 13 
such temporarily “exploded” topographies. The seemingly coherent topography is spatially 
fragmented in the chambers that exist in the attics of almost every house.20 Space and time, 
as exemplified in the episode with the Prügler, are no longer stable. Josef K. discovers 
spaces which affect time. One of these doors is the one behind which the Prügler punishes 
the clerks. Josef K. opens the door, observes the spectacle, and interacts with the Prügler and 
his victims (Proceß 75). Unable to save the two officials from their punishment, he leaves the 
chamber. When he returns the next day and opens the door a second time, the scene unfolds 
again, as if the first encounter had never happened. Time loses its importance and the space 
of the room is demarcated from any progression outside of Josef K.’s perception.21 
Als er auf dem Nachhauseweg wieder an der Rumpelkammer vorüber kam, 
öffnete er sie wie aus Gewohnheit. Vor dem, was er statt des erwarteten Dunkels 
erblickte, wußte er sich nicht zu fassen. Alles war unverändert, so wie er es am Abend 
vorher beim Öffnen der Tür gefunden hatte. Die Drucksorten und Tintenflaschen 
gleich hinter der Schwelle, der Prügler mit der Rute, die noch vollständig 
angezogenen Wächter, die Kerze auf dem Regal und die Wächter begannen zu klagen 
und riefen: >Herr!< Sofort warf K. die Tür zu […]. (Proceß 81) 
 
Another example of exploded spaces is the small door in Titorelli’s bedroom, which is linked 
to the court and the attics. The attics are connected in an impossible way. They all are 
accessible from every other entry point in the chambers. These connections create a maze of 
floors, doors, and connecting staircases and exits that move beyond the physical structure of 
                                                 
20
 The chambers are located in places where one does not expect them. Titorelli, for example, lives in a 
rundown apartment building to which the chambers are secretly attached. “’Was ist das?’ fragte er den Maler. 
‚Worüber staunen Sie?’ fragte dieser, seinerseits staunend. ‚Es sind die Gerichtskanzleien. Wußten Sie nicht, 
daß hier Gerichtskanzleien sind? Gerichtskanzleien sind doch fast auf jedem Dachboden, warum sollten sie hier 
gerade fehlen? […]’“ (Proceß 150). 
 
21
 Martin Walser argues that Kafka’s figures only fulfill a “functional role vis-à-vis the hero” (118). 
Paradoxically, the active and urging land-surveyor K. in Der Prozeß runs in circles without getting closer to any 
final destination. His range of movements is strictly limited, since he not only never clarifies his status as land-
surveyor, but also never gains physical access to the Castle. The village is a restricted microcosm in which K. 
oscillates between the inns, the school, and some other dwelling places. We shall see later how this oscillation is 
achieved by doors and the means to use them as pathways or to pierce them by employing certain devices. For 
now it suffices it to say that K. could go on forever, even though Kafka once disclosed to Max Brod that he 
envisioned the death of K. in the last chapter of Das Schloß (Brod 411). 
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the respective building. Due to the sheer inconceivable size of the irritating maze in which 
Josef K. enters, his world spatially distorts into what Adorno terms “labyrinthian 
descriptions” (256). These spaces are no longer stable and larger inside than they appear 
from the outside. The protagonist loses control over these spaces. In order to find an exit, he 
is dependant on the guidance of others who at least pretend to know how to navigate within 
these spaces. 
Conclusively, space in Kafka signifies an absence of stability and control. The 
examples imply that space in Kafka is not a representation of Euclidean space. Like the space 
presented on a movie screen, space in Kafka is not the space we experience every day. If 
space in Kafka is not Euclidean space, then what is it? We can read space in Kafka as a 
representation of a Bildraum since it shares certain properties with an image. Kafka’s Das 
Schloß tackles the problem of the spatiality of the image and the role the interface plays in 
this. A dominant metaphor of the interface to image-space in Kafka’s writing is the door. 
What we need to do, then, is to understand what doors are and what function they fulfill as 
interfaces in relation to the image. 
 
Doors in Kafka: Control and Spaceless-Space? 
 
 Controlling space is, for Kafka, to a large extent a question of movement, albeit 
movement which exceeds the notion of traversal through Euclidean space. The keyword 
“control” demands an interface that enables the subject to traverse space in order to access 
another space. The door is one such interface through which moving bodies pass. What is it 
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that a door does and how is it different from a window? Lutz Koepnick declares the role of 
doors easier to understand than that of windows (1).  
A door’s threshold marks a fixed and clearly defined point of separation. We 
can maneuver our bodies in either direction across a doorstep, we can kick doors in to 
enter a building or shut them for good to live somewhere else. Windows, by contrast, 
enable much more fluid and unstable relations. While a window’s opening invites us 
to immerse ourselves in another world’s allure, its frame at the same time reorders 
spatial arrangements and demarcates competing zones of distance and proximity. 
Doors leave us with little to wonder about: they situate us either on this or that side of 
a physical border, and with some effort, luck, or cunning we can exchange one place 
for another. (1-2) 
 
We must take into consideration the fact that the door as an interface, i.e. a means of access 
and ultimately control, is not always as simple as Koepnick suggests. Whereas windows 
surely fulfill the functions Koepnick assumes, they rely first and foremost on seeing. 
Accessing doors and traversing space demand a considerably higher involvement of the 
body’s motor functions than looking out a window. Doors can close and lock. Although 
windows can be closed as well and made opaque with the help of shutters and blinds, they 
are in themselves intended as open interfaces; gateways for looking onto the world. Doors, of 
course, are also open interfaces, since doors integrated into a wall provide a way of access for 
a moving body. But if the door is closed or locked, physical action is necessary to proceed. 
Doors are often not constructed in a way that gives access to what sight alone cannot access. 
Doors are the interface to depth and depth in turn is a prerequisite of access. 
The interface is a door into the image. In Kafka’s writings doors cannot only close 
and lock, but also conceal what lies behind them. What is located behind a door is not only 
demarcated from sight, but can, at the same time, also be distorted, inaccessible, or, just lead 
to another door. In his essay on Kafka, Adorno calls this hermetic space a “raumloser Raum,” 
a “spaceless-space,” which can without difficulty incorporate whole countries, but hardly 
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allows anything within its perimeters that runs counter to Kafka’s world (319).22 Traversal 
through spaceless-space transpires, but it is a traversal that connects such a spaceless-space 
with other spaceless-spaces. An examination of spaceless-spaces in Das Schloß reveals 
whether or not Kafka considered spaceless-spaces as accessible and controllable. This allows 
us to apply this understanding of spaceless-space to what they stand in for: the image. 
Contrary to what Koepnick states about doors, there is plenty left to wonder about the 
door as an interface. In order to take this metaphor of the door as image to its limit, any 
(open) door enables the viewer to look outside or inside the same way windows do, if one 
wishes to do just this. It is, however, in the opening of and passing through doors and 
accessing the next space that they offer a different mode of experiencing the world than is 
offered by windows. This is explicitly the case when there is nothing located behind the door 
but another door, i.e. another interface. Norbert Fürst further elaborates on the complexity of 
doors in Kafka’s work. 
[M]an sieht von ferne das Licht durch viele offene Türen fallen, an denen man 
vorher vorbeigekommen war, ohne es zu merken. Denn sie sind nicht angelegt, um 
bemerkt zu werden, sondern nur um den Schein durchzulassen. Und so kommt es, daß 
alle diese offenen Türen doch eine Zeitlang Geheimtüren bleiben. Wir können durch 
sie nicht eigentlich in die Geschichte hineinkommen, sondern nur wieder heraus (8). 
 
Following Fürst, doors in Kafka do not primarily focus on the dichotomy of here and there, 
or on the status of perspective per se, but rather on the question whether there is anything to 
access behind the door at all. They are secret doors, simultaneously concealed and 
illuminated. It is because of this illumination that the subject misses them, even when they 
are open. In fact, their purpose is to allow only the illumination to shine forth from the 
                                                 
22
 From now on the term “spaceless-space” is used to denote a special version of the Bildraum, i.e. a space that 
is definitely not a Euclidean-space but nevertheless offers an extension of its field. This extension allows 
control over the image. The term is not meant to connote a positive or negative evaluation of image-space. It 
stands as a neutral proxy for any non-Euclidean space that might or might not offer an accessible space. 
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spaceless-space they conceal. Here, the ambiguous nature of the German word Schein comes 
into play. Schein cannot only be translated as “glow,” but also as “semblance.”23 These doors 
pretend to be doors and are not a means of access anymore, but instead signify a space 
behind the door when in fact there in nothing to access. They achieve this fallacy by framing 
an image and at the same time signaling possible access into the image. Doors thus become 
mere illusions and the stable separation Koepnick attributes to the threshold becomes 
destablelized in Kafka through the putatively straightforward use of doors.  
The interface frames the threshold of these false doors.24 There are many thresholds 
(and doors) in Kafka’s works.25 For Kafka the question of the threshold is not so much about 
whether the transition is marked by a clear line or by a zone, but what kind of space, if any, 
                                                 
23
 This idea is taken to its extremes in „Die Bäume.“ “Denn wir sind wie Baumstämme im Schnee. Scheinbar 
liegen sie glatt auf, und mit kleinem Anstoß sollte man sie wegschieben können. Nein das kann man nicht, denn 
sie sind fest mit dem Boden verbunden. Aber sieh, sogar das ist nur scheinbar“ (Erzählungen 43). The twofold 
use of the word scheinbar creates a paradox that leaves nothing that is not “scheinbar.” “Scheinbar” is the 
default state of our experience. The image is the representation of this state since it puts into question its own 
realness. First, the tress are labeled as seemingly movable, which they are not. But even this is only seemingly 
the case, which leaves us with trees which at the same time can and cannot be moved. There is no third solution 
left that would solve the paradox. 
 
24
 Every door by definition frames a threshold. “Threshold,” for which the German word is Schwelle, is, as 
Samuel Weber defines it, a “transition or interval, situated between two fixed points or places” (26). Walter 
Benjamin reconfigures the concept significantly. Explaining the threshold in relation to his term “awakening,” 
Weber interprets Benjamin’s concept of the Schwelle not as “a linear transition from one state to another, […] 
but rather an experience that traverses a zone no longer bounded by the familiar oppositions of sleep and 
wakefulness, which are no longer mutually exclusive but rather overlap” (28). This expansion of the linear 
transition is already included in the German “schwellen” and this swelling leads to a break-down of linearity, 
for example in the dichotomy “public/private.” According to Weber, the dominant element of a space, to which 
the threshold is the linear transition then becomes movement itself (23-24). In other words, clear demarcations 
and transitions collapse and make way for an expanding zone. For both Benjamin and Kafka, leaving one space 
and entering another is a problem of the threshold. It is only that Kafka questions whether there is something to 
enter behind the threshold at all. 
 
25
 One might object that the word “door” appears because it is a common word. By taking a closer look on 
Kafka’s particular usage of doors it becomes apparent that they have indeed a great significance. In his short 
prose “Großer Lärm” Kafka mentions the word several times in relation to the “rooms” they grant access to. In 
“Großer Lärm” the opening and entering of doors produces noise. The intrusion of the noise of the modern 
world happens via doors and not windows. Doors are “broken through” by family members who intrude the 
space of the narrator from within the structure of his home, and the boundaries between public and private space 
collapse. There is no place of refuge left for the narrator, who in turn considers opening his door a little bit in 
order to slither into the room next door like a snake. A feeling of the world as encompassing everything without 
any chance of escape, establishes itself in these lines. The reading of “Großer Lärm” supports the assumption 
that doors have a function in Kafka’s works that goes beyond their sheer physical existence (Erzählungen 23). 
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one enters. A smooth transition into restricted space is difficult and if the threshold swells at 
all, then it only swells to block the way. The threshold instead pretends to limit one space 
from another, but is in fact useless when the space on the other side is a spaceless-space. 
Doors are interfaces which K. in Das Schloß attempts to access through bodily movement in 
order to gain control over the Castle. The image in Kafka’s work is, however, a trick, a 
seemingly stable space when it is not. The door signals passage into the image. A close 
reading of the doors in Kafka’s novel Das Schloß will help us get closer to the question, 
whether Kafka understood spaceless-spaces as distracting illusions or as powerful tools in the 
re-conceptualization of space. 
 
Das Schloß: The Inaccessibility of the Image 
 
 When analyzing Das Schloß in relation to image, control, and access, the first thing to 
encounter is the eponymous castle. The protagonist K. gains access to the hermetically sealed 
area of the Castle by crossing a wooden bridge that leads him from a “Landstraße” into 
emptiness (7). The transition leads him from a clearly demarcated realm outside of the 
village, which can be understood as Euclidean space, into the “city limits.” These city limits, 
which include the castle and the village, become the center of existence and impress 
themselves on any inhabitant of the village. The village then is the position in front of the 
interfaces, the doors, and the castle ultimately promises to await K. behind the interface. 
The first door that exemplifies the metaphor of the interface is not the first one 
mentioned in the novel.26 When K. leaves the inn for the first time, he gains access to the 
                                                 
26
  The first door in the novel confronts K. with the landlady with whom he has a rocky relationship during the 
course of the narrative. The landlady fills out the whole frame like a village version of the doorkeeper from Der 
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space of the village through a door.27 This door grants access to further parts of the 
topography of the village. After crossing the threshold, K. starts interacting with the village 
via the interface of its doors.28 This is when Euclidean space is abolished and the spaceless-
spaces come into play. Right after he leaves the inn, he perceives the castle looming above.  
Kafka describes the castle’s features at some length and whereas windows and rooms 
are mentioned as “zum Teil von Efeu verdeckt, mit kleinen Fenstern, die jetzt in der Sonne 
aufstrahlten,” doors are not a part of the structure (15). Although K. assumes doors or gates 
lead to the Castle when he asks, „sollte das Unglaubliche geschehen sein, und sie waren 
schon im Schloß oder vor seinen Toren,“ neither he nor the reader ever learns anything 
concrete about them (37). When K. gets “closer” to the Castle, it changes from an 
“ausgedehnte Anlage” into a “recht elendes Städtchen” (14). This shift in designation – the 
Castle’s denigration – infers that vision is unreliable and manipulative. The Castle is 
physically inaccessible and the only relation is a visual one.29 K. tries to overcome this 
inaccessibility by using interfaces. The problem is, as Karoline Krauss points out, that “the 
Castle’s elusiveness symbolizes the impossibility of a textual relation to objective truth” 
                                                                                                                                                       
Proceß. Although the door is open, access would be difficult because her mighty form denies it. “Die Tür der 
Küche hatte sich geöffnet, türfüllend stand dort die mächtige Gestalt der Wirtin […] (Schloß 9, my italics). 
 
27
 This is the moment in which K. activates the interface. “Er gab [dem Wirt] also noch einen Wink, ihm die Tür 
zu öffnen, und trat in den schönen Wintermorgen hinaus.” (Schloß 13). 
 
28
 Henry Sussman calls the interface a “shifting border” with which K. collides several times when he tries to 
“penetrate” the village (114). From my point of view K. does not collide with this border, since he is never able 
to reach the barrier at all. It is not possible to control what one cannot reach. Still, this is exactly what K. 
attempts. 
29
 The inaccessibility is emphasized in the following quote. “Die Straße nämlich, die Hauptstraße des Dorfes, 
führte nicht zum Schlossberg, sie führte nur nahe heran, dann aber, wie absichtlich, bog sie ab, und wenn sie 
sich auch vom Schloß nicht entfernte, so kam sie ihm auch nicht näher“ (Schloß 17). 
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(Krauss 1).30 What this translates into is the question about the image and the interfaces into 
its space.  
 These interfaces are mainly doors. They usually enable K. to enter certain parts of the 
village without ever leading him anywhere nearer to the Castle. In other words, the only 
doors he is able to enter are set within the perimeters of the village. K. oscillates between 
these doors. By oscillating between them, K. traverses through space, but makes no progress 
toward the image. Progress is a mere illusion and K. only moves between a limited number 
of places, such as the inn, Barnabas’ house, or the school building. These places are 
connected by streets and alleys which network the different spaceless-spaces of the village. If 
the Castle is read as the space behind the interface, Kafka implies that interfaces do not allow 
us to control a spaceless-space.  
There are doors in the Castle that define the spaceless-spaces further, since these 
doors can be pierced through visually by using some sort of tool. This form of the interface 
addresses the question of mediators. Frieda, the bar maid and former lover of Klamm’s, 
shows K. the “Guckloch” which allows him to perceive Klamm (45). The “Guckloch” is a 
window in a door. According to Koepnick, windows clearly signal the involvement of sight. 
The window disregards movement and relates on sight alone, thereby marking itself as a 
visual device. Later K. admits that he could not have endured Klamm’s powerful aura 
without that visual device between them, which consequently means that the impact of the 
spaceless-space on K. is reduced through the interface. Another example of how the 
                                                 
30
 This elusiveness is even addressed a couple of times in the text. The Vorsteher berates K. and hints at the 
problem of inaccessibility. “Sie sind eben noch niemals mit unseren Behördern in Berührung gekommen. Alle 
diese Berührungen sind nur scheinbar, Sie aber halten sie infolge Ihrer Unkenntnisse der Verhältnisse für 
wirklich“ (Schloß 84, my italics). The elusiveness turns into K.’s main concern. He still hopes to be able to meet 
the officials in person. The face to face communication would label his interactions as true. “Das wichtigste ist 
doch für mich, daß ich ihm gegenüberstehe. Ich habe nämlich noch mit keinem wirklichen Beamten unmittelbar 
gesprochen“ (Schloß 99, my italics). K. never tries to communicate with the image differently than he would 
with a real person. 
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separating and demarcating effect of doors and rooms can be circumvented by sight is the 
Herrenhaus. The walls do not reach up to the ceiling so that it is possible to peek into the 
room behind the door. “Der Diener ließ sich von K. auf die Schulter heben und sah oben 
durch den freien Spalt ins Zimmer“ (Schloß 274). It is possible to look at an object, but 
looking at the object seems to bring the subject in close proximity to it, when in fact the 
whole validity of this mode of perception is put into question by Kafka. The relation between 
the viewer and the object is one of disconnect, but the window communicates that this 
disconnect is only due to the sole focus on sight. This mode of viewing allows the subject to 
acknowledge the disconnect between himself and the image but at the same time fuels the 
hope of accessing the spaceless-space through physical movement.  
The object represented through the interface, Klamm, carries further implications on 
the status of the image. Klamm inhabits a spaceless-space. In other words, he only exists as 
an image.31 Klamm can be observed through the keyhole, but K. never meets him without 
utilizing an interface. K. lacks the possibility to encounter the force that holds power over 
him. Klamm, as the image of bureaucracy, is an embodiment of power that does not work on 
the basis of face-to-face communication, but rather through the mediation of the interface. 
There is no real Klamm beyond the image and this means the image, for Kafka, has no depth. 
However, although Klamm is an image, he holds power over K. Spaceless-space then is not 
accessible, but still impacts K.’s experience of the world, while he is not able to control the 
image. K. only thinks in terms of Euclidean-space in which physical movement means 
                                                 
31
 Olga even informs K. that Klamm’s real appearance is “veränderlich” (200). His gestalt is not stable. Klamm 
himself appears as an image. He sleeps with his eyes open, never even blinking, like a freeze frame. “’Er 
schläft? Als ich ins Zimmer gesehen habe, war er doch noch wach und saß bei Tisch.’ ‚So sitzt er immer noch 
immer’, sagte Frieda, ‚auch als Sie ihn gesehen haben, hat er schon geschlafen.’“ (Schloß 48). Olga says a 
similar thing about Klamm. „Von Klamm ist es bekannt, daß er sehr grob ist; er spricht angeblich stundenlang 
nicht, und dann sagt er plötzlich so eine derartige Grobheit, daß es einem schaudert. The Castle has similar 
qualities. „Wenn K. das Schloß ansah, so war es ihm manchmal, als beobachte er jemanden, der ruhig dasitze 
[…]. Es rührte sich nicht im geringsten […]“ (Schloß 114). 
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progress. The spaceless-space of the Castle, in which doors are not a means of physical 
access anymore, disorients K., since he still reads doors as facilitators of movement in space. 
In other words, K. accepts the experience of three-dimensional space as normative and 
inadequately applies this experience to the Bildraum. 
 After defining doors in Kafka’s works as interfaces through which the subject deals 
with the spaceless-space of the image, we have to focus on the sequences which utilize doors 
most explicitly. When K. interacts with Bürgel and Erlanger in chapter 18 and later witnesses 
the distribution of the files in chapter 19, space turns into one big interface. The topography 
is full of doors. K. is able to enter some of the rooms again to no avail. We have to take into 
account that these scenes take place in the Herrenhof, and not within the castle. The officials 
who are working behind the doors are not identical with the Castle. They are removed from 
the Castle and “transferred” to the village as images presented on the interface. They are 
what Barthes calls the spectrum. Although the closeness to the interface suggests to K. that 
he finally makes progress, the problem remains that he is still only dealing with an interface, 
albeit an interface that now disavows its status as interface.32 When we read Das Schloß as a 
rumination on the image, it signifies that Kafka’s answer to the question of access to and 
control over spaceless-space is ultimately one of impossibility. Kafka understands modern 
media as a means to signify that spaceless-spaces are subject to the same rules than 
Euclidean space. What happens is not that new media erase reality, but that it tricks the 
subject into the belief that traversing spaceless-space follows the same rules as traversal 
                                                 
32
 In media theory the interface is considered most skillfully executed when the user does not recognize the 
interface. Neumark reminds us that “the cleaner and simpler the interface looks, the better, because it is less 
likely to bedazzle the user away from his or her main aim of following the well laid navigational paths as 
quickly and efficiently as possible” (305). 
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through Euclidean space. Kafka tells us that there is a Bildraum, but we cannot gain access to 
it. 
 While trying to enter the spaceless-space behind the door, K. gets confused by the 
sheer number of doors. He cannot remember through which of the indistinguishable doors he 
was summoned and again K. holds no control over his situation.33 This multiplication of 
doors can be thought of as the multiplication of interfaces. Whereas K. navigates very slowly 
through the village at first, the assumed closeness to the Castle not only offers a multiplicity 
of interfaces, but also seemingly facilitates and accelerates access. K. traverses through space 
and utilizes interfaces, only to be eventually referred to the next room and then the next 
room. Erlanger bangs on the walls and commands K. to come over. Bürgel, one of the 
secretaries, reacts to this order as follows: 
Nun gehen Sie, ich weiß nicht, warum Sie mich so ansehen. Wenn Sie noch 
lange zögern, kommt Erlanger über mich, das möchte ich sehr gern vermeiden. Gehen 
Sie doch; wer weiß, was Sie drüben erwartet, hier ist ja alles voll Gelegenheiten. Nur 
gibt es freilich Gelegenheiten, die gewissermaßen zu groß sind, um benützt zu 
werden, es gibt Dinge, die an nichts anderem als an sich selbst scheitern. (Schloß 304) 
 
This sentence carries several ideas about how the interface seems to allow the subject, K., to 
enter spaceless-space, when in fact it does not. The focus of the interaction is on physical 
movement, as K. is urged to “go” and traverse from here to “there.” By traversing through 
space K. is able, according to Bürgel, to gain access to an abundance of “opportunities,” 
which ultimately are of no use. Again, the rules of Euclidean space are mistakenly applied to 
spaceless-space. This scene ushers in the distribution of files which K. witnesses. Files, as a 
representation of data, are placed in front of the doors, submitted to officials, and sometimes 
even negotiation and trickery must be applied to carry the files over the threshold (Schloß 
                                                 
33
 The interaction with the interface takes place as follows. “Er suchte Erlangers Zimmertür, aber da der Diener 
und Gerstäcker nicht mehr zu sehen und alle Türen gleich waren, konnte er sie nicht finden“ (Schloß 288). The 
uniformity of the interface turns the interaction into a random choosing of options. 
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310-313). When the interfaces are accessed, it resembles a “Kampf mit den Zimmern” 
(Schloß 312). The threshold turns into a physical barrier, which allows access only through 
bodily force, for example when the clerk puts his “Fuß zwischen Tür und Pfosten” (Schloß 
313). For K., this signifies that the utilization of the body is a means of accessing the world 
of the castle through doors. Kafka makes it clear that K. enters some of the rooms behind the 
door. K. now believes that he has physically entered the Bildraum through the interface. Still, 
he is nowhere near the Castle, which represents the space of the image. 
 Ultimately, the image and its spaceless-space in Das Schloß remain inaccessible. It is 
typical of Kafka to point out that spaceless-space exists, but that it is, however, inaccessible 
to us. Erich Heller writes that Kafka felt “separated from the all things by a hollow space,” 
not able to “reach to its boundaries”(82). The inclusion of sensory-motor functions creates 
movement through space, but a form of movement which is meaningless in terms of 
progression in spaceless-space. The more the interface hides its interfaceness, the more it 
suggests that involvement of the body grants access to the space of the image. While 
traversing through a Bildraum the same way K. would through Euclidean space, he is unable 
to accept the fact that there is a goal, but unfortunately no possible way to reach it. 
 Space is in crisis, Das Schloß tells us. For Kafka it is not stable matrix for experience. 
Consequently in a world full of images, Euclidean space is replaced by spaceless-space. This 
spaceless-space is akin to the image and represented through interfaces. These interfaces can 
be doors, which evoke the possibility of passage into the image. Reading Kafka clarifies that 
the image is not accessible, at least not in the same way as Euclidean space. If it is accessible 
at all, we have to find different means of access. The rise of the moving image, from early 
cinema to video games, has posed new challenges to our interface with the world. In Das 
 25 
Schloß, K. fails because he attempts to gain access to the Castle through movement. He 
misinterprets the interface and does not adapt to the properties of the moving image. K. fails 
to acknowledge that the characteristics of Euclidean-space are not valid anymore and tries to 
utilize the interface in the same way he would utilize a physical three-dimensional door. 
Thereby, he relinquishes all forms of control for himself. The image can be a door and the 
spaceless-space behind this door is not inferior to Euclidean space, but rather different. Kafka 
tells us that we cannot enter the image as long as we do not adapt to the changed qualities of 
our environment. This environment is full of images we need to understand in order to 
proceed. Refusing this learning process will bring the idea of progress to a halt, since the 
inappropriate utilization of spaceless-space is distractive. Spaceless-space can consume 
energy without producing any effects. Inherent in spaceless-spaces is the danger of taking 
this energy away from dealing with the given status quo. 
Kafka’s spaceless-space challenges our understanding of what it means to traverse 
through space, since a Bildraum has to be accessed differently. These spaces, according to 
Kafka, are part of the topography of the modern world, although they cannot be measured by 
moving through space. They might be embedded in or hidden behind images, they might 
even be the images in themselves, but they are accessible only when we reconfigure our 
understanding of space and find a way to gain access to the restricted spaces of the image.  
 
Chapter Two: 
The Image in Wonderboy in Monsterworld 
 
Introduction: 
 
Franz Kafka understands the Bildraum as inaccessible and control over it as 
impossible. Nevertheless the image in photography and cinema signifies the possibility of 
access via its respective interface. The application of non-Euclidean space to these spaceless-
spaces, according to Kafka, created the fallacious impression that we can enter into and 
thereby control the image. However, one of the most popular digital media, the video game, 
is a spaceless-space that allows us to do just this. The player of a video game can enter and 
navigate through the image. The player exerts control over an avatar and thereby enters a 
video game.34 Control is indispensable when it comes to playing video games. Without the 
control of the player, all that remains is an algorithm that cannot be executed because of a 
lack of input. The physical input of the player is crucial in order for an avatar to traverse 
through space, albeit a space that is ultimately flat. Even 3-D games are, of course, two-
dimensional images on a screen which produce depth of field. Relevant for the 
                                                 
34
 “Avatar” is a concept in Hindu mythology that describes the descent of a deity to the earth in a manifest 
shape. In a video game, the “avatar” is the manifestation of the player on the screen. Technically, the collection 
of pixels which can be directly controlled by the player and fulfills a representative function is termed the 
avatar. The original meaning of the word already hints at the difficulty to pinpoint the avatar. Both the religious 
component and the transformation of something abstract into something concrete show that the relation between 
player and game is not a simple one. 
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contextualization of Kafka’s thoughts on space in relation to video games is how the bodily 
involvement of the gamer challenges the alleged inaccessibility of the Bildraum.  
This chapter examines the interfaceness of doors in video games. I shall argue that the 
video game space is a modern rumination on Kafka’s spaceless-space, albeit a spaceless-
space which, at first sight, can be accessed and controlled. The video game interface is a door 
through which the image can be entered. Reading video games through Kafka shows what an 
effect the access to spaceless-space of the image has on the relation between the individual 
and the space in which he navigates. This chapter combines Gilles Deleuze’s taxonomy of 
cinematic images with Mark Hansen’s concept of technology as an extension of the body. 
The main part of this chapter illustrates the relation of body and image through a close 
reading of a video game against Kafka’s critique of non-Euclidean space.  
The focus of this chapter is on the video game Wonderboy in Monsterworld. It was 
released by Sega in 1992 on the Genesis game system. It is a narrative in which the avatar 
Shion has to save his homeland from an evil force and rescue the princess. The player’s 
manual includes a section entitled “The Story so Far” and sets the direction for this action-
adventure game that adopts dominant elements from fantasy novels and films. The game also 
includes short episodes set within the game world in which a story is revealed step by step. 
Wonderboy in Monsterworld is a set of horizontally and vertically scrolling jump and run 
screens in a fantastic fairy-tale-like world. The game features occasional montage techniques, 
for example when the avatar enters doors. The avatar is able to “talk” to certain inhabitants of 
Monsterworld (i.e. scripted written text is presented on screen) in order to gain information 
about his task. The player must solve puzzles by collecting certain hidden items which must 
be later used in the right situation. While proceeding through the narrative, the avatar gains 
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new skills and improves its status. Since it is not divided into traditional levels but rather 
includes thematically and graphically distinctive but connected areas, such as castles and 
deserts, Wonderboy in Monsterworld is structurally fluid. However, areas which are filled 
with hostile creatures are at times demarcated from each other by village-like structures, in 
which the avatar can roam without being attacked. In these villages the player can purchase 
items, restore the avatar’s life energy, and gain pieces of information. 
The reason for choosing this game lies is its reliance on clearly two-dimensional and 
non-realistic landscapes as immanent in most of the games from its era. The emphasis on 
two-dimensionality gradually waned in the era of 16-bit technology and is trumped today by 
more immersive, i.e. three-dimensional, surroundings that followed the release of Sony’s 
PlayStation in 1995.35 Due to the limited potentials of the medium at the time Wonderboy 
emerged, the bulk of published games epitomize the centrality of a sensory-motor schema in 
video games. This means that the sprites36 are placed within two-dimensional landscapes 
which offer a mise-en-scene in which a third-person avatar moves through the virtual setting, 
literally overcoming the obstacles of a narrative.37 The skills needed to master the narrative 
are sufficient hand-eye co-ordination and familiarity with the conventions of video games, 
and a general knowledge of the interface of a given game. The interface enables the player to 
traverse a Bildraum. Any movement executed by the player via a controller according to 
certain sensory stimuli emanating from the screen leads to a motor representation of this 
                                                 
35
 For an overview on video game history consult Steven L. Kent’s The Ultimate History of Video Games. 
 
36
 A sprite is any accumulation of pixels that create a moving image on the screen which can have a direct effect 
on the avatar. The avatar is a sprite in itself. Obstacles, opponents, and platforms for example are sprites, but not 
avatars, since they are not directly controlled by the player. 
 
37
 Narrative is meant here in a very broad sense. The discussion on the term itself and its validity in the context 
of video games is an important debate in the field of video game theory. For an overview see Jesper Juul 156. 
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movement by the avatar. This in turn creates a feedback loop between the real world and the 
game-world. In other words, the video game image is a space that can be entered. 
 
A Different Image: The Video Game and the Body 
 
The image on a movie or television screen is two-dimensional. Nevertheless, it 
depicts three-dimensional space. Consequently, there exists a discrepancy between three-
dimensional spaces and the image. This discrepancy triggers notions of absence. Theories of 
the new media image are dominated by notions of absence. Walter Benjamin analyzes the 
loss of aura and Marshall McLuhan examines the gaps between pixels produced by the 
cathode tube in a television set.38 Paul Virilio mourns the loss of entire dimensions, which 
creates the non-dimension of the pixel while Jean Baudrillard assumes a full scale loss of 
reality itself.39  The consensus suggests that the new media image is an image that is 
incomplete. McLuhan delivers a clue where to find the means for a completion of the image. 
                                                 
38
 Benjamin’s main interest in terms of the moving image is on cinema. What is lost is the „aura“ of a work of 
art and cinema. For Benjamin, the fragmented technical structure compensates for the absence of aura. “[W]as 
im Zeitalter der technischen Reproduzierbarkeit des Kunstwerks verkümmert, das ist seine Aura” (1963 13). 
McLuhan’s concept of hot and cold media compares cinema to television. For McLuhan, the gaps between 
pixels on a television screen have to be actively filled by the viewer. “The TV image offers some three million 
dots per second to the receiver. […] The TV image is now a mosaic mesh of light and dark spots […]. As in any 
other mosaic, the third dimension is alien to TV, but it can be superimposed” (313). “The TV image requires 
each instant that we ‘close’ the spaces in the mesh […]” (McLuhan 314). For McLuhan, the image is about the 
apparatus and the viewer, and not about its content. 
 
39
 Paul Virilio writes specifically about the digital pixel. He argues that the digital image not only loses one but 
rather all dimensions. “Finally the fractionary dimensions are the heirs to that Lost Dimension, the informatic 
punctum, the pixel that allows the instantaneous projection of data, the representation of a synthetic, digital 
form-image, which […] is also a presentation  in true size of the form-object” (109). Interestingly, Virilio, like 
Barthes, uses the word punctum. Whereas for Barthes the punctum is an extension, Virilio labels it as the 
residue of absence. Jean Baudrillard assumes the absence outside or behind the image. “Such would be the 
successive phases of the image: it is a reflection of a profound reality; it masks and denatures a profound reality; 
it masks the absence of a profound reality; it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure 
simulacrum” (6). The question of what to expect “behind” the interface is very relevant in Baudrillard’s 
argument. 
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His famous phrase “the medium is the message” and its appendix that “the content of every 
medium is always another medium” eventually labels thought as the first (or last, depending 
on the point of view) medium in this chain (8). Thought creates movement, and movement, 
in turn, creates control over an image traversing through spaceless-space. In other words, 
video games offer a possibility of reversing the notion of absence by allowing the user to link 
his body to spaceless-space. The infusion of the body into the image fills the absence 
inherent in the image. The diegetic landscape is accepted as a stable space.40 Has the image 
perhaps never been deficient, but rather waiting for an infusion of physical agency? Have 
video games unmasked Kafka’s lessons on spaceless-space as a fallacy? 
To answer these questions we need to understand what it is that enters the spaceless-
space of the video game. Deleuze’s taxonomy of images provides a set of terms helpful for 
defining the video game image and its relation to the body. What he calls the “movement-
image” is especially applicable to video games until the early nineties.41 According to 
Deleuze, the movement-image is “the acentred set […] of variable elements which act and 
react on each other” establishing a common ground to start from since it perfectly describes 
the relation of the objects within video games (217).42 These objects act and react to each 
other, because the idea of a video game is to keep the actions and reactions on a level that 
                                                 
40
 This term makes a distinction between “diegetic activity (what the player’s avatar does as a result of player 
activity) and extradiegetic activity (what the player is physically doing to receive a certain result)” (Wolf and 
Perron 15). The terminology also includes non-diegetic elements, which are not part of the narrative’s world, 
such as the credits or the score. In this thesis, the diegetic world is the game world presented on screen in which 
the avatar navigates. 
 
41
 The creation of images similar to Deleuze’s time-image is hard to achieve on 8 and 16-bit systems, due to the 
demanded graphical complexity of image-types such as the crystal image. 
 
42
 Jacques Ranciere explains the movement-image further: “The movement-image, the image organized 
according to the logic of the sensory-motor schema, is conceived of as being but one element in a  natural 
arrangement with other images within a logic of the set […] analogous to that of the finalized of our 
perceptions and actions” (107, my italics) 
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sets an avatar into a favorable relation to other objects on screen. The relation is ideal when 
the avatar does not touch obstacles that would prevent the player from continuing and 
touches objects which facilitate and allow for the intended progression. However, not every 
subcategory of the movement-image is necessarily equally applicable, nor is the movement-
image in general the perfect match since the problem of the acentred system of relations 
poses the following difficulty. Although the avatar might not necessarily be located in the 
center of the screen, it definitively is the center of the diegetic world, because the avatar is 
linked with the player in the most direct way.  
As for the subcategories of the movement-image, technological limitation renders a 
concise application of the affection-image almost impossible. The overall simplicity and 
artifice of the sprite stifles any possibility to “refer […] to its object by internal 
characteristics,” which Deleuze defines as an essential part of the affection-image (217). The 
perception-image seems to be more closely linked to the visual component of video games, 
but is actually difficult to apply, too. Since Deleuze defines it as “a perception in the frame of 
another perception,” it can work only in three-dimensional simulations (217). This leaves us 
with the action-image and yet another sub-category, the impulse-image. The action-image 
and its “reaction of the centre to the set” are as close as possible to the representations on the 
screen (217). The problem of the acentred set that is important because the movement-image 
per se dissolves due to the now possible existent center. In Wonderboy in Monsterworld, the 
avatar’s directive (as the centre of the set) is to fulfill various tasks which are placed within 
the mise-en-scene.43 In order to accomplish this task the avatar has to move (walk, climb 
ladders, jump) and react appropriately to obstacles, pitfalls, and doors. These are precisely 
                                                 
43
 These tasks can be relatively simple, for example when the avatar has to cross a huge gap by jumping from 
one solid block to another. Other tasks are more complex and demand the finding of an important item in a 
maze-like structure in order to open the gate to another level. 
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what Deleuze calls a “set of qualities and powers as actualized in a state of things, thus 
constituting a real milieu around a centre” (1). Other properties of the action-image, such as 
being an “internal link between situation and action,” are self-evident in the logic of video 
games (Deleuze 218).  
Deleuze’s impulse-image, which “designates the qualities or powers related to an 
originary world (defined by impulses),” includes the idea of player activity (218). It is clear 
that Deleuze had cinema in mind when he created his taxonomy. For this reason, the concept 
of the impulse-image has to be adjusted for it to fit the context of video games. The 
aforementioned “originary world” is related to the game-world of the video game in which 
the qualities (i.e. the rules of the game and the affordances) and the powers (for example the 
imitation of the laws of nature specified within this world) take shape. These qualities and 
powers are then linked to the extradiegetic space of the user in front of the screen. The result 
is a modified version of the movement-image that is heavily dependent on the sub-categories 
of the action-image and a modified version of the impulse-image. This modification takes 
place because the movement of the image is induced from the outside. It is altered by an 
external force, which sets up complex feedback loops between cognitive and bodily actions 
and reactions formulated against a background of sight, sound, and tactility.  
A critical language for reading video games must be a Frankensteinian construct. 
Given video games’ likeness to cinema, this language must be pieced together from modified 
parts of Deleuze’s movement-image and action- and impulse images, which are then fueled 
by human input. Having established this type of image by cutting away parts of different 
image-concepts, the crucial involvement of the human body and mind in the creation of a 
genuine type of image has to be validated as a factor that actually determines the properties 
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of the new image. Mark Hansen establishes a connection between the player and the video 
game image which exceeds the notion of the video game controller (or the system as such) as 
being a “mere vehicle for translating the real into a form,” but rather being an “operation of 
the real itself” (2000: 200). Exactly because the movements on screen are either directly 
controlled (the avatar by the player) or at least indirectly influenced (appealing to the 
obstacles’ looped subroutines), the screen presenting the game is not an intermediary, but 
located more closely to the human agent. Video games are not demarcated from the world. 
Rather they are a medium of immersion into an environment of active bodily experience 
within a spaceless-space. Hansen terms these bodies which experience technology as an 
extension rather than a limitation “bodies in code.” Bodies in code are defined as mediators 
which use the  
 concrete technology of virtual reality to stage a disconnection of the 
(fundamentally motile) body schema from the (fundamentally visual) body 
image. […] Such technical mediation of the body schema (of the scope of 
body-environment coupling) comprises […] a body in code (Hansen 2000: 
20).  
 
Hansen argues that embodiment is realized in “conjunction with technics” (2006, 20). Virtual 
realities expand the scope of bodily (motor) activity, instead of confining them. The 
immersion in virtual realities broadens human perception and the range of experience. 
Hansen declares every reality a “mixed reality” and states that “motor-activity […] holds the 
key to fluid and functional crossings between virtual and physical realms” (2006, 2). The key 
word here is “crossing” and it hints at the concept of the threshold discussed in chapter one. 
How is this externally induced movement-image different from other images? It is 
different because the video game image enables a user to reach into and access a spaceless-
space. Roland Barthes argues that posing in front of a camera transforms one “in advance 
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into an image” (10). Any player of the video game not only transforms into an image but also 
occupies two spaces at the same time, both  being the “I” and the “Other.” This new 
experience clearly marks video game space as different from Euclidean space. Furthermore, 
the digital image erases the certainty Barthes finds in relation to the photo and what he terms 
the that-has-been is not given in the digital image (77). There need not be a referent in the 
world since the digital image, like painting, “can feign reality without having seen it” 
(Barthes 76). Technically, the digital image can perfectly copy reality it has never seen. 
Where a photograph is, according to Susan Sontag, a privileged “slice of space as well as 
time,” the moving image of the video games is an eternal flow of present tense (22). The 
video game image makes sense only in relation to a player who perceives it. It cannot be 
stored in albums and fulfills its original purpose only in relation to the body.44 Although the 
following is partly due to the technological limitations of the time, the video game discussed 
in this thesis, clearly signals its being a digital image. Whereas the photograph, according to 
Barthes, has its punctum linked to a past that-has-been, the video game opens its punctum 
only to the now. The punctum of the photograph is a coincidence of two unrelated events 
which creates an extension of the field.45 The video game studium is not a coincidence, but 
rather a prefabricated spaceless-space which leaves no room for these types of coincidences. 
The difference between photograph and video game then lies not only in the video game’s 
                                                 
44
 Or more precisely, it can only do these things when it is transformed into another medium, such as a 
photograph or a video recording. 
 
45
 Barthes gives the example of a picture by Koen Wessing. (24-26) Two nuns pass behind a group of soldiers 
in Nicaragua. For Barthes, the punctum is the coincidence that these nuns were there, exactly at the moment 
when the photograph was taken. Their non-relatedness to the soldiers is what extends the field for Barthes and 
thereby opens up the image. 
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strong signaling of its spatial difference, but also in its focus on space instead of time.46  Both 
images are accessible, but only the video game image is accessible in the moment without 
referring to a history. By omitting the past, the punctum opens in a different way in video 
games than it does in photography. For the photograph, the actual entering of the extended 
field is only explained through access to meaning, but not through access to the Bildraum 
itself. The video game opens into the present and this extension of the field allows the body 
to enter the image in the here-and-now. This creates the spaceless-space of the video game 
image.  
The inaccessibility of the image as critiqued by Kafka is contested through video 
game space which is clearly not three-dimensional but, nevertheless, controllable. The 
juxtaposition between Das Schloß and the video game allows a rethinking of the concept of 
both spaceless-space in digital media and print. To a certain extent, the video game image 
reproduces the spaceless-space described in Kafka but labels them accessible.47 What are the 
effects when spaceless-space becomes physically accessible and ultimately controllable?48 
To answer this question, we first have to understand how the video game image functions in 
terms of control. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Spatialization is a prominent concept in video games. It privileges “space over time” and flattens “historical 
time” (Manovich 78). For Manovich “time became a flat image or a landscape, something to look at or navigate 
through” (78). 
 
47
 The video game not only reproduces spaceless-space but also openly marks it as a simulacrum. 
 
48
 As stated in Chapter 1, Susan Sontag argues that overcoming a feeling of insecurity is the main reason for 
trying to take control over an image. 
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Space in Video Games: On Control in Video Games 
 
Let us return to Franz Kafka in order to find a precursor of the moveable image on 
screen. In “Die Verwandlung,” Gregor Samsa defends a picture of a woman clad in a fur boa 
against his mother and his sister.  
 Er wußte wirklich nicht, was er zuerst retten sollte, das sah er an der im 
übrigen schon leeren Wand auffallend das Bild der in lauter Pelzwerk gekleideten 
Dame hängen, kroch eilends hinauf und preßte sich an das Glas, das ihn festhielt und 
seinem heißen Bauch wohltat. (Erzählungen 102) 
 
This framed picture is a flat image similar to the one we find in video games. Although this 
image does not move, it tells us something about the depth of and control over the image. A 
woman in furs is depicted and Gregor rubs his body against her image. The fact that they stay 
separated through a layer of glass does not decrease the level of affection Gregor feels 
towards this image. We learn earlier in the novella that his prior social interaction with 
women was very limited. The picture is not a photo of a lover, but rather frames an unknown 
woman. This fact does not keep him from trying to have physical contact with the image. 
Gregor Samsa tries to access a two-dimensional space, an image behind glass to which he 
attributes corporeality and which he hopes to possess and control. However, the cold glass 
atop the picture clearly demarcates Gregor’s hot body. Is this image behind the glass 
comparable to the image of the video game? 
The interaction between an avatar and a player resemble the narrative style of the 
“uni-mental” perspective that binds the reader to the protagonist.49  In video games, the 
                                                 
49
 The avatar is a version of the “mediale Lebensform,” which we discussed in Chapter 1. In video games, and 
especially in online role-playing games, the avatar is the most recent development of such life-forms. The 
anonymity of the internet (or the game world) creates the Schutzraum in which the player can avoid interaction 
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player controls the avatar so that the perspective of the player is to a certain extent “uni-
mental” as well. But the player of video games holds control over the avatar and the 
navigable spaces.50 The apparatus allows the player to access the spaceless-space on the 
screen and experience it as navigable. Video games signal control over spaceless-space 
through the conventions of Euclidean-space; a method that Kafka labels inadequate.  
Space in Kafka is marked by a disconnect between reader and protagonist in order to 
emphasize this inadequateness. Is this disconnect also a feature in video games such as 
Wonderboy? In most video games the player controls one avatar at a time.51 The resulting 
effect then is not a feeling of fragmentation but rather one of connection. The avatar on 
screen becomes a proxy of the player, but stays clearly demarcated from the subject in 
control.52 Although the perspective in video games is structurally similar to Kafka’s “uni-
mental” perspective, with the exception of the control the player exerts, its result is not a 
disconnect. Player and avatar traverse space simultaneously and always occupy the same 
space in the text. Otherwise, the player does not interact with the text and control is 
completely abolished for the time being. The result of this specific feature is a stronger 
connection of the player with the avatar, since the avatar cannot roam the game world alone 
                                                                                                                                                       
with other human beings. The avatar as a proxy navigates the medium and thereby erases any chance of 
traumatic events. Still, the activities on screen affect the player. 
50
 Alexander Galloway reminds us that video game space is explorable. Film never requires “the construction of 
full spaces” (63). The director holds full control over what appears in a mise-en-scene. “By contrast, game 
design requires the construction of a complete space in advance that is than exhaustively explorable” (64). In 
video games the course within game space is, although not unlimited, not completely pre-determined. 
 
51
 Although it is the case especially in newer Internet games in which players can create avatars which cross 
racial, gender, and species boundaries, more traditional video games suture the player to one particular avatar. 
Only in certain multiplayer online games, Norie Neumark reminds us, “body parts are interchangeable, one can 
‘re-spray- one’s color, one can change one’s sex. And one will find lots of men cross-dressing as woman” (302-
303). These possibilities don’t even include the “cross-speciing” that takes place between female humans and 
male elves. Traditional video games rarely allow for a creation of such a customized character. 
 
52
 The avatar is a representative and not a representational image. 
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while the player scans the playing field. This stronger connection reduces the critical distance 
of the player to the text. Where Kafka equips the reader with the chance of critical distance, 
despite the reader’s proximity to the protagonist, the space of the video game is more 
encompassing and immersive. Critical distance inside the system is a difficult feat. Space in 
video games is able to reduce critical distance for the player when involved in the game via 
control. What is it about technological control that so significantly changes the relationship 
between user and text? 
 Control, in relation to technology, can be described twofold. Firstly, as David Lyon 
points out, control can mean the “social control inherent in these technologies” in general 
(51). This ultimately deals with the distribution of access to these technologies and the 
resulting social and economical inequalities. The question here is one of availability of access 
to technology of certain groups. Secondly, once one gains access to a given technology, how 
does technology itself influence the individual’s relation to virtual space? The latter element 
is of importance for the relation between spaceless-spaces and three-dimensional bodies. This 
concept of control splits again into two diametrical variants, which in this form only apply to 
digital media and, moreover, video games. The first strain asks how video games are used to 
produce meaning and exert control. The second strain is the control that is exerted by the 
player. In relation to Kafka’s writing it is the second variant of the second strain in which 
there is a common ground for an analysis. By utilizing the human-computer-interface (HCI) 
the player gains a very specific form of control over a spaceless-space. This control is, at first 
sight, undeniable, since any player who masters the interface of a functional system is able to 
control the avatar as far as his gaming skills allow. In Kafka, control over restricted spaces is 
signified, but remains in fact an illusion. Video games offer a blatant form of control in order 
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to master spaces which are clearly not Euclidean. This control is exerted via interfaces. How 
do interfaces function in a digital environment?  
 
Control over Spaceless-Space: Digital Interfaces and Diegetic Landscapes 
 
 Let us define the interface in relation to digital media. For Lev Manovich “the 
interface acts as a code that carries cultural messages in a variety of media” (64). The human-
computer-interface “describes the ways in which the user interacts with the computer. HCI 
include physical input and output devices” (Manovich 69). Manovich also argues that the 
appearance of the interface “shapes how the computer user conceives of the computer itself” 
(65). It thereby communicates an understanding of the world. Any interface that uses 
windows arranges access in a well-ordered grid and stays true to “modernist values of clarity 
and functionality” (Manovich 63). But, as Mark J.P. Wolf points out, other interfaces efface 
the clearly drawn line between man and machine and try to be as invisible as possible. 
 The interface bridges the gap between the diegetic world and that of the 
player. Whether by mouse, joystick, […] or keyboard, some additional means of 
inputting player actions must be integrated into the design of the game. Informational 
graphics and nondiegetic displays are combined with game play in a variety of ways 
[…]. Likewise, the way players’ actions are transmuted to their on-screen surrogates 
are often designed to be as transparent or intuitive as possible […]. (3-4) 
 
Accordingly, the interface of the video game is defined through two interrelated 
characteristics. One is the physical device of the controller and the other is the representation 
of the player’s input on the screen. The player gains access to the surface structure of the 
game through a combination of these two features. Since the player “enters” the image via 
the interface, the metaphor of the door is quite tenable for video games. As Wolf and Perron 
argue, “the interface […] is really a junction point between input and output, hardware and 
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software, and the player and the material game itself, and the portal through which player 
activity occurs” (15, my italics). Norie Neumann rhetorically asks whether doors are “such 
popular images on the interactive interface” because the move into an interface is a 
movement from materiality into information where doors open that could not open in 
Euclidean space (304). We can infer two effects of the interface from this question. First, the 
interface is a means to leave a certain space behind in order to enter another space. Second, it 
shows that the space behind the interface is marked as different from Euclidean space. 
Virtual doors in video games are still images, but they transform a spaceless-space into a 
pseudo-Euclidean one. Doors in video games do not only look like doors, but they are also 
representations of access to the Bildraum. Doors in video games are graphic metaphors of the 
depth of images that can be entered and controlled. 
In Das Schloß, different types of doors represent different types of interfaces. A more 
straightforward version of the interface is the key hole through which K. perceives Klamm. 
The more covert interfaces are the doors in the Herrenhaus since they make K. believe that 
he could in fact access the Castle. The interface of a video game such as Wonderboy in 
Monsterworld incorporates both overt and covert interfaces. On the one hand, it makes it 
very clear that there is an interface, the controller, and that the player has to learn the 
conventions of the game. These conventions are usually presented on screen in a 
straightforward visual manner. Pushing the crosskey of the controller up will trigger some 
form of upward movement. On the other hand, the notion of the mediating interface is 
removed after some time and replaced by a feeling of “natural” control, through which the 
mediation of the interface is forgotten and one navigates naturally. Of course, the interface 
remains, but the player accepts it as a normative relation to video game space.  
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By controlling the interface the avatar moves through the Bildraum. Time is 
presented via movement through space in a landscape that has no depth. How is it possible to 
create “depth” in video games and even more so in 2-D video games? The answer is that the 
diegetic landscape incorporates elements which “create” depth where there is none. In this 
respect, space in video games is similar to the spaceless-spaces in Kafka’s writing. Before we 
further compare Das Schloß to Wonderboy in Monsterworld against the background of space, 
we need to analyze closely the role of doors as interfaces to depth in video game space. 
 
Wonderboy in Monsterworld: Virtual Doors into Spaceless-Space 
 
Doors, in one form or another, have been an important signifier of depth in video 
games from the start.53 The longing for depth stems from the normative experience of space 
as three-dimensional, since depth is, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues, the “most 
‘existential’ of all dimensions” (298). The user only assigns meaningfulness to space if it, at 
least, simulates depth. For Merleau-Ponty, depth experienced on flat surfaces is already an 
instable concept, “through which the whole of the drawing strives towards its equilibrium by 
delving in depth” and “depth is born beneath [the] gaze because the latter wants to see 
something” (305-306).54 The heavy reliance on depth as a signifier of “realness” is also 
evident in Das Schloß. K.’s focus on movement through space comes from the overall notion 
                                                 
53
 On of the most door-heavy games is Gremlin’s Westbank. The game presents no avatar at all and the player 
looks directly at three doors on the screen. The task is to watch who opens these doors and react accordingly, 
i.e. to either collect money from customers or eliminate villains who try to rob the bank. Here the notion of 
depth is less important than the notion of the threshold. 
 
54
 Merleau-Ponty rhetorically asks the following about images which create depth when there is none: “Since in 
this case I imagine that I see depth when there is none, is this not because misleading signs have given rise to a 
hypothesis, and because generally the alleged vision of distance is always an interpretation of signs” (305). 
Merleau-Ponty critiques the acceptance of depth as normative. 
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that the value of space stands in direct connection to its depth. K.’s powerlessness is rooted in 
his inability to enter into the unstable space of the image which he hopes to navigate. Since 
video games create a notion of depth that has no equivalent in reality, it is arguable that they 
resemble the exploded spaces in Kafka’s writing. When an avatar leaves the screen through 
an exit on the left of the screen and then immediately reappears on the right side of the 
screen, video game space is marked as independent of the Euclidean rules of space and time 
as experienced outside of the diegetic world. Video game space thus functions similarly to 
Kafka’s topographies insofar as the avatar triggers actions in the same way K. does in Das 
Schloß. This triggering, which Walser calls the “vis-à-vis role,” is strongly embedded in the 
logic of the video game (126). A door that conceals an object is opened by the player and the 
object is retrieved only then.  
 Since the topography of Wonderboy in Monsterworld is an accumulation of images 
without depth, it has to pull off a trick to accomplish a sense of depth. The trick is achieved 
by doors, through which the avatar is able to enter buildings and places. In Wonderboy, the 
player places the avatar in front of a door and pushes the controller up to enter the place that 
lies beyond. Two optical effects visualize this action. The first effect removes the outer 
structure of a building, leaving just an ephemeral outline of the door and giving the player 
insight into the building’s interior. The second effect takes place when the avatar enters an 
“invisible” door or a portal to larger spatial structures and utilizes montage. The scene fades 
to black for a second and, when it returns, the avatar finds itself located at some other place 
in the diegetic game world. This is one of the rare moments in which the fluid structure of the 
game is broken by cinematic montage.  
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The aforementioned “invisible doors” stand in close connection with the notion of 
depth. Scattered all over the game world are doors which have no visual representation in the 
game world. These doors can sometimes be found by virtue of their absence. For example, 
there might be a visible area of the game which seems inaccessible, but includes a visible 
door. This allows the player to assume, when familiar with the conventions, that an invisible 
door exists in the vicinity thereby granting access to the seemingly inaccessible section of the 
game where a reward awaits the player.55 This use of doors adds layers to the architectural 
structure of the diegetic world. They are located “behind” the space on screen, exceeding the 
depth of field, whereby the player gains control over the Bildraum. These layers strongly 
signify that the spaceless-space of the video game can be accessed by the avatar which is 
physically linked to the player. 
 Within the layers of video game space, the avatar fulfills a vis-à-vis role and space 
features exploded structures similar to those in Kafka’s writing. The result, however, differs 
from what K. experiences in Das Schloß. In Kafka’s writing, the actions that are triggered by 
the protagonists do not amount to anything.56 In video games, the agency leads toward the 
completion of the game, but is also quickly met by an opposing force.57 Usually any Easter-
                                                 
55
 What is called by insiders an “Easter-egg,” was first used in Warren Robinett’s video game Adventure 
(1978), which was released on the Atari 2600. Through a complex array of actions, involving a ‘Gray Dot’, the 
player is technically able to discover a secret room, which displays nothing else than the author’s name “like a 
throbbing, multicolored movie marquee” (Robinett xviii). Atari’s company politics were the reason for the 
secret room, since they did not allow their programmers to give credit to themselves in the games or on the 
cartridge boxes. Adventure gives no direct hint at this hidden part of the game. A player may only stumble 
across it by chance or draw indirect feedback from the fact that there is an item, the ‘Gray Dot’ that seemingly 
has no practical value in the course of the game’s completion. Robinett calls finding the secret room “the meta-
level, the way to truly beat the game and get to the real conclusion” (xviii). 
 
56
 Klamm evades K. precisely in those moments in which K. triggers an action, exemplified in the scene in 
which K. is waiting for Klamm outside and inside of the Kutsche (Proceß 118). K is told that he is going to miss 
Klamm anyway, whether he waits or leaves (Proceß 121). 
 
57
 Let me briefly elaborate on the term “agency.” Jonathan Culler states that the question of “agency” is “the 
question of how far we can be subjects responsible for our actions and how far our apparent choices are 
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egg facilitates progress or at least gives the player the satisfaction of having truly beaten the 
game. Whereas space in video games is as fragmented and vis-à-vis activated as it is in Das 
Schloß, the video game signals a stronger possibility of access and depth, despite the 
presence of non-Euclidean space. Where Kafka’s space is dominantly unstable despite its 
very stable appearance, video games mark themselves as non-Euclidean spaces, whose depth 
the player, in spite of their flatness, accepts.  
Space in Kafka exceeds the three geometrical dimensions. Applying Ernst Bloch’s 
concept of the gate allows a reading of Kafka in which traversing from one plane of existence 
to another takes place in order to leave a certain space behind. Often, death is the decisive 
step that allows protagonists to cross the threshold and achieve progress.58 Video games 
connect the idea of progress to the concept of levels. Video games are already spaceless-
spaces and players deal with a traversal from one plane to another spaceless one, the moment 
they activate the interface. Where Kafka’s topographies exceed three-dimensionality, video 
games necessarily reduce space to two dimensions and still convey depth. The game offers 
virtual thresholds that allow the same understanding of progress that many of Kafka’s 
protagonists have to achieve through death. “Death” in a video game runs counter to the idea 
of escape in Kafka. In video games, death means failure and not progress. Whenever an 
avatar “dies” it was unable to follow the game’s trajectory. Death is almost always followed 
                                                                                                                                                       
constrained by forces we do not control” (45). The notion of constraining forces in relation to control on the 
subject is apparent in the structure of video games.  
58
 However, not even the instability of space is stable. “Der Jäger Gracchus” is dead, but still cannot proceed. 
His “Todeskahn verfehlte die Fahrt, eine falsche Drehung des Steuers, […] daß ich auf der Erde blieb und daß 
mein Kahn seither die irdischen Gewässer befährt“ (Erzählungen 220-221). He traverses space without making 
any progress although he is dead and even able to travel “durch alle Länder der Erde” (Erzählungen 221). 
Gracchus also mentions a gate which he can see but never arrive at. “Auf dieser unendlich weiten Freitreppe 
treibe ich mich herum […]. Immer bin ich in Bewegung. Nehme ich aber den größten Aufschwung und leuchtet 
mir oben schon das Tor, erwache ich auf meinem alten, in irgendeinem irdischen Gewässer öde steckenden 
Kahn” (Erzählungen 221). Death does not fulfill its purpose of allowing the dead to move on to the next plane 
of existence. 
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by a resurrection through the “continue” function. Furthermore, the possibility of replays is 
existent as long as the player is present. Only by not dying can the avatar move on to the next 
level and ultimately fulfill its digital death drive at the completion of the game. In 
Wonderboy, these levels are very large structures which are not necessarily demarcated from 
each other by montage. Although the levels differ in the challenges they pose and their 
design, they are constructed in a fluid line of succession. Space in video games is a reduction 
of dimensions, whereas space in Kafka is an extension of dimensions. Paradoxically, this 
reduction is responsible for a notion of access to the spaceless-space. This paradox has its 
roots in the control the spaceless-space of a video game signifies. 
In Das Schloß, the protagonist has no control over access to restricted spaces. K. is 
only granted access to spaces that are open spaces, which contribute nothing to his search. 
Video games signal absolute control, at least for the player. In order to understand how a 
player controls the diegetic landscape, doors are again helpful. An invisible door exists in an 
area of the game which represents the capital of Monsterworld. This door is located within 
the city’s architecture, among various visible doors. The invisible door grants passage to a 
shop in which “charmstones” can be traded for useful items which facilitate progress.59 In 
comparison to Kafka’s writing, the doors in Wonderboy appear to be a means of access. 
Although progress has to be negotiated at some of these doors, they are ultimately meant to 
be entered. Nevertheless, some doors are “invisible” or even locked, and the task of the 
player is to find the different “keys” in order to open these doors so that the avatar can 
proceed. In other words, the moment of the threshold in video games is one that signals 
                                                 
59
 To make a long story short: charmstones are items that have seemingly no meaning in the game world. They 
can be discovered at hard to reach places, but they fulfill no purpose in the completion of the game. The player 
can finish the story without ever having to use or even find one. Still, when found, they facilitate progress and 
give the player the satisfaction of having discovered a secret.  
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access to the image. It keeps its promise as a threshold. Doors, as used in Wonderboy, evince 
progress.  
The control of the player enables the avatar to move past the barrier and enter the 
space behind the door, the message being that there is no door that cannot be opened. 
Otherwise it would not be possible to complete the game. Such a situation can only come up 
as the result of an error in the code, a so-called glitch. Kafka’s concept of space allows for 
another less affirmative reading of video game space. Similar to K.’s belief that traversal 
through space ultimately allows him to progress within spaceless-space, the video game 
communicates the presence of control over the Bildraum. The video game protagonist, the 
avatar, is literally guided by a higher force. Control in video games signifies that the player is 
in the same position as the Castle’s officials.60 However, the player’s control, read through 
Kafka’s critique, is in fact limited by a code that is only indirectly accessible via the 
interface. The code is the one door that leads to no image and to which we have no access. 
The player enters the space of the image and traverses through it towards a goal, but never 
arrives at the code. The image is only a representation of spaceless-space that can be 
controlled by relying on the rules of Euclidean space. This possibility conceals that there is 
still an invisible force at work within the image-space: the code of the game. 
There exists a code in Das Schloß. Like the invisible doors in Wonderboy, it can be 
assumed by its absence in the Herrenhof episode in Das Schloß in which K. has access only 
to representations of the code. Images are mere representations of the code. The officials are 
crystallizations of the operating algorithm and are clearly disconnected from the castle at that 
moment of their appearance in the interface. In analogy, the code of the video game presents 
                                                 
60
 If we pursued a theological interpretation of Das Schloß, the game would designate the player an almost God-
like position.  
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the possibility of a player as images on the screen, but never reveals itself. It dwells as 
invisible and inaccessible “behind” the interface just as the Castle authorities do in relation to 
the village.61 The code in Das Schloß is not even the Castle itself since the architectural 
structure is visible. The Castle is a representation of the code but it is not the code per se. The 
code in Kafka’s novel remains hidden. It is a non-visible structure of power-relations that is 
only expressed through interfaces and images. The inaccessible and confined spaces, to 
which K. either gains no true access or in which he is trapped resemble the limitations of the 
code in video games. These limitations are concealed by what McKenzie Wark terms a 
“perfect unfreedom,” the effect by which control over open spaces conceals the fact that 
other spaces are restricted (40).  
The code in video games presents colorful images as its representation on the screen, 
which hide the fact that the underlying structure is not accessible. In Das Schloß, K. does not 
accept the special qualities of the image and tries to gain access to it. He fails to realize that 
traversal through three-dimensional space loses its importance since he does not deal with a 
Euclidean space anymore. The video game player usually acknowledges the image of the 
virtual world as such, but is willing to accept the image on the television screen as a 
Euclidean space over which he holds control. The reading of Wonderboy against Kafka’s 
critique allows two diametrically opposed conclusions. First, video games critique the 
privileging of Euclidean space and allow the individual to rethink the possibility of traversing 
other non-Euclidean spaces. Images, Wonderboy tells us, are spaces which can be accessed. 
Second, video games strengthen the dominance of three-dimensional space by simulating 
                                                 
61
 Other individuals tell K. about the access they gained to the Castle. The uni-mental perspective of the novel 
renders such accounts unreliable. K. has no way to prove that these reports are true, since he never accesses the 
Castle. Olga, for example, disseminates the same message as the doors themselves. She tells K. that there are 
doors, “Barrieren, die man durchschreiten kann, wenn man das Geschick dazu hat” (208). Olga herself only 
relies on Barnabas’ report and promotes the idea of the body and its “Geschick” as a means of progress. 
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Euclidean space when, in fact, there is none. In the “three-dimensional” space of the video 
game, control seems possible. In analogy, the video game image implies that control over 
three-dimensional space is always possible as a means of progress. 
This first reading of video games is only possible after the second reading is 
countered. In order to do so, the concept of control in video games has to be reconfigured. 
Video games are said to exceed traditional texts through control that allows for alteration. 
Theorists in the field of video game culture often deploy this argument and correctly assume 
that no game sessions are identical and whereas “narrative authors […] have one shot in their 
gun – a fixed sequence of events,” video games resemble a machine gun (Frasca 227). The 
avatar can be moved at a different speed, in different directions, and it is possible for the 
player to discover multiple ways that lead toward the goal. Although this is a valid point, the 
alteration of the text is a means to create an illusion of control granted to the player. Whereas 
it is true that many games feature diverse ways toward their completion, they stay within the 
predetermined course of the code. Even if there are infinite ways of navigating the avatar 
through the diegetic landscape, the code of the game is fused into single corrective nodes. 
These nodes, in which the infinite possibilities of the game play are pinpointed into one 
single strain, are usually located between levels. These foci often use montage to structure 
the game’s progression. Consequently, although the alteration of video games as texts cannot 
be denied, it is a tenable assumption that the nodes of a video game significantly lower the 
player’s control over the game’s progression. Therefore, control in video games is linked to 
the “open” spaces in Kafka, which indeed signal infinity and control. Open spaces are mere 
stage-sets whose limits the individual cannot overcome. Control over these open spaces is as 
possible as it is useless, since for Kafka the restricted spaces, the code, are relevant for the 
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modern experience.62 Ultimately, the image is created by language, the programming code of 
the video game. This language remains inaccessible while signifying a possible entrance via 
the image. Structurally, this is exactly how doors work in Das Schloß. 
Space in video games is divided into open and restricted spaces. On the one hand, 
space in video games offers the player control, but, on the other hand, this control only 
reaches as far as the code allows. The code signals that completion is possible as long as the 
player follows the rules. The game’s “value and its relation to other values,” says Wark, “can 
be discovered through trial and error” (30). The code of the game is, depending on the angle, 
clearer or even more fallacious than the one in Das Schloß. The video game at least offers 
rules to follow, even though its language remains hidden in the Bildraum. Nevertheless, it 
conceals the fact that to win means to “know the system” and follow its rules (Alexander 
Galloway quoted in Wark 30).63  
Kafka’s critique and understanding of modernity triggers a notion of space in crisis. 
Space for Kafka is no longer stable that the subject of the modern experience must deal with 
the disappearance of demarcations in the world that are nonetheless signified. Space in Kafka 
exceeds three-dimensional space and adds various dimensions, such as time and death. 
Whereas the individual has no means of defense against the destabilization of space, (i.e. the 
lack of access to restricted spaces) the dominant forces in a power discourse declare spaces 
open and restricted. While open space is easily accessible, restricted space limits the 
possibilities of any individual agency. Through bodily involvement the subject strives to 
enter the image, though he is, in fact, cut off from it. For Kafka, doors show how space 
denies access. Doors function as interfaces which signal the possibility of access. 
                                                 
62
 Control is not however necessarily easy. This depends on the difficulty level of the game. 
 
63
 This is taken from a non-published manuscript from which Wark quotes Galloway. 
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Traditionally, the appearance of doors communicates the invitation to cross a threshold in 
order to traverse space. In Kafka’s writing, they lose this capacity and infuse the individual in 
an eternal loop which never arrives at any goal.  
Video game space appears to be more stable and goal-oriented. It is more stable 
because it reduces space to two dimensional landscapes and attests to a higher degree of 
control. Apart from programming errors, there is no door that cannot be opened. Usually, the 
player manages to access any space within the diegetic game world and the threshold always 
signals progression as long as the sensory-motor skills of the player are sufficient. What 
Kafka allows a reader of video games to acknowledge is the video game image as 
structurally similar to the images in Das Schloß. Through an image that is accessed via an 
interface, the player, unlike K., experiences the illusion of control.64 The image signals that 
traversing virtual space allows the exertion of power, when, in fact, the power-creating 
authority, the code, is concealed by the image and thereby remains as inaccessible as the 
code we never get to enter – that which invisibly demarcates the Castle from the village.   
 
Areas for Further Research: 
 
Control, in the video game sense of the word, is not per se a means of reversing the 
absence felt in media theory as long as this control takes place within the machine. Control 
has to be taken outside of the machine, beyond the interface and out of the Herrenhaus in 
order to regain critical distance. Control cannot be achieved by moving a body directly 
towards the castle, but by leaving the village first and looking for different pathways.  
                                                 
64
 At the same time we should not forget that there is a form of control inherent in video games. This control 
allows the player to access and control images via an interface. 
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 The Bildraum exists, although Kafka sees no way to reach it. Further research will be 
able to take more steps toward the image in order to enter it through a door. Gilles Deleuze 
and Fèlix Guattari already point the way. In their book on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that a reader of Kafka’s works does not simply follow the main protagonist. Instead, 
they see the structure of the topography in Kafka’s works as a rhizome through which the 
reader accesses what Deleuze and Guattari label the “Kafka-machine” (7). The reader enters 
the machine and becomes part of it, thereby abandoning all hope for interpretation since it is 
not possible to look at the machine from the outside (7). The machine sets up a cramped 
space in which all individuals have “to connect immediately to politics” because Kafka 
refrains from establishing a true narrator (17). The impossibility of interpretation within the 
closed system of the machine creates an environment that makes it difficult to connect to 
politics. The reader can roam within a restricted space, but, like the protagonist, is limited by 
the next barrier as long as he stays within the machine. The video game image is the next 
step toward spaceless-space, but it in order to enter it, we have to leave the closed system of 
the machine behind and connect to politics from the outside.  
 Where is the outside of the system located? The answer to this question goes beyond 
the scope of this thesis. But in order to tackle this question, we need to come to terms with 
the extensions the image creates and their relation to power. Susan Sontag argues that “a 
capitalist society requires a culture based on images […] in order to stimulate buying and 
anesthetize the injuries of class, race, and sex” (178). However, it is not the spectrum of the 
image that carries these powers, but rather its link to the viewer, Roland Barthes’ extension 
of the field. Just as the code of the Castle controls K., the image exerts power over the 
subject. The “perfect unfreedom” inherent in video games is strikingly similar to Sontag’s 
 52 
concept of freedom in photography where “freedom to consume a plurality of images and 
goods is equated with freedom itself” (178). Similar to Kafka’s open spaces, it is a freedom 
only in relation to the image. We have to accept the image as a space, albeit a Bildraum that 
has depth, which the viewer, then, might be able to control. “Images,” Sontag says, “are more 
real than anyone could have supposed” (180). The acceptance of depth reconfigures our 
evaluation of the image as real. Once we accept the image as such, it is easier to comprehend 
that images convey “real” power. The acknowledgement of images as elements within a 
power discourse allows us to take them seriously, to contest them, and to enter them through 
a different door than the ones they so blatantly offer.   
 These alternative doors have properties similar to those of video games. They exist 
only in relation to the individual in the present tense. Already for the photograph, Barthes 
states that the true image gains its “truth” always in relation to a given subject, as “the truth 
for me” (110).65 In his doorkeeper legend, “Vor dem Gesetz,” Kafka makes a similar 
statement. The door to the law is only meant for a single person.66 Thus, access to the image 
is a question of time as much as it is a question of space and the body. If even the present 
tense is not sufficient in order to enter spaceless-space, the image might point toward the 
future. Perhaps there, we will finally be able to cross the threshold. This thesis read a video 
game through Kafka. Kafka, in turn, has to be read through the video game and new media. 
Time might be the key to the door into the image. 
 
 
                                                 
 
66
 It is the doorkeeper who tells the man at the end of his life that the gate was exclusively meant for him: “’Hier 
konnte niemand sonst Einlaß erhalten, denn dieser Eingang war nur für dich bestimmt. Ich gehe jetzt und 
schließe ihn’“ (Erzählungen 178). The gate closes now which infers that it has been open all the time. The man 
dies without ever having accessed the law because he, in contrast to K., never strove for the door at all. 
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